Greek of the Week: Nomos and Physis, Pt. 3

Picking up where we left off with Callicles last week, we observed that many of his ideas were indicative of a certain mood which found varying expressions in fifth century Athens.

We've already seen, in Aristophanes' Clouds, for example, the notion of holding animals up as models for "natural" human behavior. And as for nature as the basis of international relations we need not look any further than Thucydides (The History of the Peloponnesian War 5.105.2 (quoted below) and 4.61.5): in the course of trying to negotiate peace between rival Sicilian cities, Hermocrates of Syracuse warns the other delegates of the dangers of internal fighting amongst themselves while Athens sits waiting to move in (4.60). He finds the Athenian strategy to be perfectly understandable, and says that he lays no blame on those who are resolved to rule, because "it has always been human nature (for the stronger) to rule over those who submit" (πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν τοῦ εἴκοντος).

Continuing with Callicles, what justification, he goes on to ask, did Xerxes or his father have for invading foreign lands, if not that they were acting according to the nature of right (κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου), indeed according to the law of nature (κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως), though this is not a law that humans have made (483d6-e4). Here we have the first coinage of the paradoxical term "law of nature". For the sake of clarity it should be mentioned that the sense in which Callicles uses the term should not be confused with the later Stoic lex naturae ("natural law"), nor with the "laws of nature" with which modern scientists are concerned.

This formulation does have an earlier parallel in Thucydides 5.105.2 ("The Melian Dialogue") where we see the Athenians inform the Melians that he should rule who can as a matter of natural and eternal necessity:

ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως αναγκαίας οὖ ἄν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν· καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ...

From our opinion of the gods and of human nature we hold that clearly it is a general necessity of nature to rule where one is able. We did not make this law, nor were we the first to utilize it once it was made. It existed when we received it, and it will continue to exist forever when we have left it behind...

There is no denying the similarities between the positions of Callicles and the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue. Particularly striking is the notion of some principle in nature which says that the strong rule the weak regardless of any human-made laws. It is also obvious that both positions can be reduced to one of self-interest. Where they part ways, however, (and the difference is perhaps a subtle one), is in the Athenians' lack of any appeal to a consideration of "right".

The Athenians are "realists": "we are doing this because that is just the way the world is." Callicles, on the other hand, is not arguing that just because it happens this or that way in nature it is better (he is not reducing "ought" to "is"). In his rejection of conventional in favor of natural "right" as something better and morally superior he is saying that clear thinking individuals have come to judge that what is right by nature is superior because it is the nomos of nature, it is what nature prescribes (P. Shorey, What Plato Said (1933) 154).

...

Greek of the Week: Nomos and Physis, Pt. 2

For the character of Callicles in the Platonic dialogue Gorgias, nomos and physis are, for the most part, opposed or contrary to each other (ὡς τὰ πολλἀ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ νόμος) (482e5-6). Callicles, however, goes well beyond anything known to have been said by either Hippias or Antiphon.

For Callicles, laws are made by the majority (ὁι πολλοί), who are the weak (ἀσθενεῖς, 483b4-6). Because they fear the strong (δυνατοὺς ὄντας) they make laws for themselves and to their own advantage (συμφέρον). In order to prevent the strong from gaining an advantage (πλέον ἔχειν), the many try to frighten them by telling them that it is shameful and evil to claim a larger share (πλεονεκτεῖν), and that injustice consists of seeking (τὸ ζητεῖν) to have the advantage over others (483b7-c5). Callicles supposes that, because they are inferior, the many enjoy their "equality" (τὸ ἴσον), and that it is for this reason that they call it shameful and unjust to have advantage over them (483c5-8).

Callicles does not think, however, that this is the way that things are supposed to be:

ἡ δέ οἴμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸ ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν, τὸν
ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ
ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ
τοῖς ψένεσιν ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κὲκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ
ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν.

But to my mind nature herself shows us this: that it is right for
the better to have more than the worse, the strong more than
the weak. And it is clear in many instances that this is so
among animals and among races of men and in entire
nation states, that right has been judged in these terms:
the stronger have more than and rule over the weaker.
(483c8-d6)

Although Callicles ultimately surpasses everyone in the extreme nature of his formulations, many of his ideas are indicative of a certain mood which found varying expressions in fifth century Athens...

Greek of the Week: Nomos and Physis, Pt. 1

For many later sophists nomos [law;custom] appeared not simply as a constraint on human nature, but as a tyrant over it, which ran contrary to nature. And so Hippias (Plato, Protagoras 337d), for example, could say that "nomos is a tyrant over human beings: in many ways it constrains us contrary to nature" (... ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρἀ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται...). The same sentiment is echoed in a fragment of Antiphon's (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 87A 44): "the majority of just acts according to law are prescribed contrary to nature" (τὰ πολλἀ τῶν κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολεμίος τῇ φύσει κεῖταἰ). In these passages the antithesis between nomos and physis [nature] appears clearly enough. Whereas earlier sophists, however, had seen nature as being essentially "what is," and nomos as being "what ought to be," later sophists sought to elevate physis above nomos, and from nature derive valid norms. Some would take this idea to radical extremes, and in the process set about the destruction of all traditional notions of law and convention and posit a "right life according to nature."

Greek of the Week: An Interesting Question...

A character in a lost play by Euripides (Aeolus, Fragment 19) asks an interesting question:
τί δ' αἰσχρὸν ἤν μὴ χρωμενοῖς δοκῇ;
(Is anything shameful if it does not seem so to those doing it?)

... I'm stumped...

Greek of the Week: Natural Law?

We have an interesting fragment this week from the Pre-Socratic Anonymous Iamblichi (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 89.6.1), in which the writer not only appears to deny that nature and human constructs are antithetical, but goes so far that it could be called an attempt to reconcile the two ideas.

εἰ γὰρ ἔφυσαν μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδύνατοι καθ᾽ ἕνα ζῆν, συνῆλθον δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῆι ἀνάγκηι εἴκοντες... [εὕρηται] σὺν ἀλλήλοις δὲ εἶναι αὐτοὺς κἀν ἀνομίαι διαιτᾶσθαι οὐχ... διὰ ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας τόν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ οὐδαμῆι μεταστῆναι ἄν αὐτά. φύσει γὰρ ἰσχυρὰ ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῦτα.

If men were by nature unable to live alone, but yielding to
necessity they communed with one another... yet they
discovered that they could not live with one another without
laws, we can conclude that because of these necessities law
and justice rule as kings among men, and that in no way could they change, for these things have been firmly fixed by nature.

"Law and justice rule as kings... fixed by nature"... I like the sound of that...

[Note: Anyone familiar with classical Greek or with fonts (fontography?) and typography has probably noticed that the Greek text in these posts has a less-than-perfect appearance. I'm aware of the problem and have been trying to fix it. I have, however, been stymied in my efforts. It doesn't seem to matter what I do. It looks like shit in Blogger's html editor, then it looks quite nice in "compose" or "preview" mode, finally it looks like shit after I hit the "publish" button. I've even tried copying and pasting very nice looking Greek from other sites, but it comes out of Blogger looking like crap. I continue to work on the problem...]

Greek of the Week: On the "Prescriptions" of Nature

There's an amusing moment in The Clouds by Aristophanes. In the play the character of Pheidippides has been sent by his father to partake of the "New Learning" (i.e. the teachings of the "Sophists") so that he can learn how to make "wrong into right" (i.e. learn the art of "Rhetoric"). He learns too well it seems, because he returns home and beats his father, offering the following theoretical justification for his act:

σκέψαι δὲ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τἄλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί,
ὡς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται: καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
ἡμω̂ν ἐκει̂νοι, πλήν γ' ὅτι ψηφίσματ' οὐ γράφουσιν;

Observe the rooster and all of the other animals,
and how they punish their parents. How, in fact,
do they differ from us except that they do not pass laws?
(1427-29)

To which his father Strepsiades replies:

τί δῆτ᾽, ἐπειδὴ τούς ἀλεκτρυόνας ἅπαντα μιμεῖ
οὐκ ἐσθίεις καὶ τὴν κόπρον κἀπὶ ξύλου καθεύδεις

Well then, since you imitate the rooster in all things,
why don't you eat shit and sleep on a perch?
(1430-31)

Have I ever mentioned that I'm quite fond of the Greeks?

Greek of the Week

Just because I can...

...ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι᾽
αὐτάρκειαν οὐθεν μέρος πὸλεως, ὥστε ἢ θερίον ἢ θεός

One who is unable to live in a community, or does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of the polis, and is therefore either a beast or a god.

--Aristotle, Politics 1253a27-29

More in the days ahead...